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ABSTRACT 
  The conventional wisdom among many legal scholars is that 
judicial independence can best be achieved with an appointive 
judiciary; judicial elections turn judges into politicians, threatening 
judicial autonomy. Yet the original supporters of judicial elections 
successfully eliminated the appointive systems of many states by 
arguing that judges who owed their jobs to politicians could never be 
truly independent. Because the judiciary could function as a check 
and balance on the other governmental branches only if it truly were 
independent of them, the reformers reasoned that only popular 
elections could ensure a truly independent judiciary. Using a data set 
of virtually all state supreme court decisions from 1995–1998, this 
Article provides empirical support for the reformers’ arguments; in 
many cases, judges seeking reappointment vote even more 
strategically than judges seeking reelection. My results suggest that, 
compared to other retention methods, judges facing gubernatorial or 
legislative reappointment are more likely to vote for litigants from the 
other government branches. Moreover, judges increasingly favor 
government litigants as their reappointments approach, which is 
consistent with the judges voting strategically to avoid reappointment 
denials from the other branches of government. In contrast, when 
these judges are in their last term before mandatory retirement, the 
effects disappear; without retention concerns, these judges are no 
more likely to vote for government litigants than other judges. My 
empirical evidence suggests that elective systems are not the only 
systems that produce bias; appointive systems also threaten judicial 
independence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For almost a century, few debates have been the subject of more 
legal scholarship than the debate over the election versus 
appointment of state judges.1 Much of the debate has centered on the 
tradeoff between judicial independence and accountability.2 An 
independent judiciary is often defined as “one that does not make 
decisions on the basis of the sorts of political factors (for example, the 
electoral strength of the people affected by a decision) that would 
influence and in most cases control the decision were it to be made by 
a legislative body.”3 The conventional wisdom among lawyers and 
scholars is that an appointive system can best achieve an independent 
 
 1. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges, 40 
SW. L.J. 31, 31 (1986) (“[I]t is fairly certain that no single subject has consumed as many pages in 
law reviews . . . over the past fifty years as the subject of judicial selection.”). 
 2. Id. at 34. 
 3. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 875 n.1 (1975). 
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judiciary.4 Judicial elections, they argue, turn judges into politicians at 
the expense of judicial independence. Indeed, based on these 
arguments, many states’ judicial selection systems have evolved away 
from pure elective systems and toward more hybrid models. 
Substantial empirical evidence establishes that retention 
concerns strongly influence judges facing reelection, making them less 
independent than judges facing gubernatorial or legislative 
reappointment.5 Using a data set of virtually all state supreme court 
decisions from 1995–98, however, this Article shows empirically that 
in many types of cases, judges facing reappointment are more likely 
to vote strategically than judges facing reelection. Although these 
findings contradict the conventional wisdom, they support the fears of 
the original proponents of judicial elections. Many of those original 
reformers feared that an appointive system made judges “the 
instruments of power . . . registering the mandates of the Legislature, 
and the edicts of the Governor.”6 My empirical evidence suggests 
that, in certain types of cases, the reformers may have been right. 
The debate over judicial independence is especially important 
because “more than 90% of the [United States’] judicial business . . . 
is handled by state courts.”7 Despite the dislike that many academics, 
elite lawyers, and federal judges have for judicial elections, 
 
 4. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive 
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 276 
(2002) (discussing problematic aspects of state judicial elections); Steven P. Croley, The 
Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694–99 
(1995) (investigating the justifications for elected judges in light of constitutionalism); Robert P. 
Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality and Representativeness, 31 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 409, 420–22 (1981); Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., Judicial Selection: The Political Roots of 
Advice and Consent, in HENRY J. ABRAHAM ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, 
AND POLITICS 3, 5 (1990) (“[I]t can be argued that the quality most needed in a judge is the 
ability to withstand the pressures of public opinion in order to ensure the primacy of the rule of 
law over the fluctuating politics of the hour.”); Ben F. Overton, Trial Judges and Political 
Elections: A Time for Re-Examination, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 15–17 (1988–89); Michael 
H. Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1555, 1559–63 (1988). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 74–86. 
 6. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective 
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 206 (1993) (quoting 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, at 462 (Arthur Charles Cole ed., 1919) [hereinafter 
ILLINOIS CONVENTION OF 1847] (statement of David Davis)). 
 7. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice, Wis. Supreme Court, The Ballot and the Bench, 
Address at the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice (Mar. 
15, 2000), in 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 976 (2001) (citing Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ 
Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy, 2 
J.L. & POL. 57, 77 (1985)). 
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approximately nine in ten of all state court judges face the voters in 
some type of election.8 
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court recently articulated their 
disdain for judicial elections when the Court reluctantly upheld New 
York’s system for electing judges. In their concurrence, Justices 
Kennedy and Breyer noted, 
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct 
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for 
competition among interest groups and political parties, the 
persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the 
perception and the reality of judicial independence and judicial 
excellence.9 
They concluded, 
The rule of law, which is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a 
functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional 
attainments, and the absolute probity of its judges. And it may seem 
difficult to reconcile these aspirations with elections.10 
Likewise, Justices Stevens and Souter agreed with “the broader 
proposition that the very practice of electing judges is unwise.”11 They 
regretfully concluded, “The Constitution does not prohibit 
legislatures from enacting stupid laws.”12 
Despite the deeply rooted conviction that judicial elections are 
inconsistent with judicial independence, retention concerns should 
only influence elected judges’ voting in the types of cases whose 
outcomes are important to voters or interest groups. In other types of 
cases that involve the interests of state governments, however, judges 
facing gubernatorial or legislative reappointment may feel pressure to 
vote strategically. Retention by the governor or legislature offers 
those branches of government direct opportunities to sanction judges 
 
 8. Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 
(2007) (citing SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT 
CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2005: SUPPLEMENT TO EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 
2005, at 91–92 fig.G (2006), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2005_files/ 
State%20Court%20Caseload%20Statistics%202005.pdf). 
 9. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joined by 
Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring). 
 12. Id. (quoting Thurgood Marshall, J., United States Supreme Court). 
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for unpopular rulings. Judges that consistently vote against the 
interests of the other branches of government may hurt their chances 
for reappointment. As a result, in many cases, judges seeking 
reappointment may feel pressure to vote for the interests of the 
executive or legislative branches. For example, in cases in which the 
state government or a state agency is a party, judges seeking 
reappointment may feel pressure to vote in favor of the government 
litigant. Or, in statutory review cases, reappointed judges may be less 
likely to overturn existing legislation. 
Thus, the strategic voting of state judges may resemble that of 
legislators. Just as legislators are electorally pressured to consider the 
relative intensity of their constituents’ preferences on different 
issues,13 judges might consider the intensity of their constituents’ 
preferences about the outcomes of different cases. As elected judges’ 
primary constituents are the voters, judges facing reelection are more 
likely to vote consistently with the voters’ preferences in cases that 
the voters care strongly about. Similarly, as appointed judges’ 
constituents are governors or legislatures, judges facing 
reappointment should vote consistently with the preferences of the 
other governmental branches in cases in which those branches have a 
stake. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss how judicial 
selection in the states shifted from gubernatorial and legislative 
appointments to elections as part of the Jacksonian era’s championing 
of popular democracy.14 The desire to curtail the power of the 
legislatures and governors clearly motivated the shift from appointed 
to elected judges. The reforms reflected the sentiment that the 
judiciary could function as a check and balance on the other 
governmental branches only if it truly were independent of them. 
Because the appointive system produced judges that were beholden 
to politicians for their jobs, the reformers reasoned that the only 
means to a truly independent judiciary was election by the people. 
In Part II, I discuss the independence of judges under different 
selection and retention systems. Despite the original reformers’ 
confidence that an elected judiciary would be more independent than 
an appointed one, the reality of judicial elections soon led to a 
growing distrust of electorates. Trends in judicial elections, including 
 
 13. See generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990) 
(arguing that legislators make decisions in response to perceived preferences of constituents). 
 14. See infra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
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increases in competitiveness and the importance of campaign funds, 
further threatened judicial independence. 
Indeed, substantial empirical evidence establishes that retention 
concerns influence the voting of judges facing reelection. Many of 
these empirical studies, however, have focused on the types of cases 
that matter to voters, such as cases with politically controversial issues 
or cases between out-of-state businesses and in-state plaintiffs that 
are voters. It is not surprising that appointed judges would appear to 
be more independent in these types of cases; the governors or 
legislatures to whom the appointed judges are beholden often have 
little or no stake in the case outcomes. In other types of cases in 
which state governments do have a stake, however, judges seeking 
reappointment by the governor or legislature may be less 
independent than their elected counterparts. 
In Part III, I examine empirically whether judges facing 
gubernatorial or legislative reappointment vote strategically in civil 
cases involving government interests. I use a data set that includes 
detailed information on virtually every state supreme court case in all 
fifty states between 1995 and 1998. It includes more than 28,000 cases 
involving more than 470 justices. The data include variables that 
reflect case histories, case participants, legal issues, case outcomes, 
and individual justices’ behavior. Using multivariate regression 
techniques, I test whether judges facing gubernatorial or legislative 
reappointment are more likely to vote for government litigants than 
judges under other retention methods. 
My results suggest that, compared to other retention methods, 
judges facing legislative reappointment are more likely to vote for 
litigants from the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the 
judicial branch, and for general government litigants. Similarly, 
judges facing gubernatorial reappointment are more likely to vote for 
an executive branch litigant and for a general government litigant. 
Although the magnitudes of the voting differences are not large, they 
are consistent and statistically significant. 
Further estimations are consistent with the hypothesis that 
judges in appointive systems vote strategically to avoid 
reappointment denials from the other branches of government. My 
results reveal that judges facing reappointment are more likely to 
vote for government litigants as their retention approaches, 
suggesting that retention concerns are an important influence. My 
results also show that in gubernatorial reappointment systems, judges 
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in their last term before mandatory retirement are less likely to vote 
for government litigants than if they were not retiring. This result 
suggests that when these judges no longer have retention concerns, 
they are no more likely to vote for government litigants than other 
judges. 
Despite the evidence that judges facing gubernatorial or 
legislative reappointment are more likely to vote for government 
litigants than judges under other systems, I find only weak evidence 
that these judges are less likely to overturn existing legislation in 
statutory review cases. The weak results, however, are consistent with 
a previous study that finds that appointed courts are no less likely to 
overturn statutes because courts that do not want to overturn the 
legislation of the other government branches refuse to hear the 
statutory challenges in the first place. 
In Part IV, I discuss the implications of the results. Although 
numerous legal scholars have observed the flaws in elective systems, 
this study shows that appointive systems are not without problems. 
Moreover, whereas some scholars defend elected judges who vote 
strategically as being “accountable” to the people they represent, 
strategic voting by appointed judges is harder to defend because it 
threatens the separation of powers that underlies American 
democracy. Thus, each system poses its own set of distinct risks that 
states should consider when evaluating their existing systems or 
considering reforms. 
I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SELECTION AND 
RETENTION OF STATE JUDGES 
Eighty-nine percent of all state court judges face the voters in 
some type of election.15 Yet, this method of selection and retention is 
relatively unique to the American states.16 In fact, the selection of 
state judges originally resembled that of the federal judiciary; in all of 
 
 15. Schotland, supra note 8, at 1105 (citing STRICKLAND, supra note 8, at 91–92 fig.G). 
 16. Exceptions include lower judges in Japan who face retention elections after every ten 
years of service. David M. O’Brien, The Politics of Judicial Selection and Appointments in Japan 
and Ten South and Southeast Asian Countries, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL 
POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 355, 355 (Kate Malleson & 
Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). Additionally, supreme court judges in several Latin American 
countries must stand for reelection before various legislative bodies. LAURIE COLE, CANADIAN 
FOUND. FOR THE AMERICAS, SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS FOLLOW-UP SERIES, ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE AMERICAS 8–9 (2002). 
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the original thirteen states, judges were appointed either by the 
executive or legislature.17 
In 1832, however, Mississippi became the first state to elect all of 
its judges.18 Beginning with the New York constitutional convention 
of 1848, every state that entered the union until 1912 had judicial 
elections.19 By 1865, twenty-four of the thirty-four states elected their 
judges.20 
“Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the rise of 
judicial elections.”21 Some have argued that the movement reflected 
an “emotional commitment to the idea that the people should elect 
all of their officers.”22 Others have maintained that the reform was 
purely political, and that the reformers believed that judicial elections 
were the only way “to replace Whig judges with partisans of their 
own.”23 Yet others have reasoned that the reformers believed that an 
elected judiciary would “professionalize the bench and boost its 
importance.”24 
Although each explanation likely has some truth, it is clear that 
the shift from appointed to elected judiciaries occurred as part of the 
Jacksonian era’s championing of popular democracy.25 A core value 
of Jacksonianism was a distrust of unrepresentative, unaccountable 
government officers.26 Convention delegates in many states supported 
the shift to the popular election of judges because they distrusted 
state legislatures. Reformers “‘denounced the legislature’s 
uncontrolled spending and unwillingness to serve a diverse body of 
 
 17. ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 14–15 (1955). 
 18. LARRY C. BERKSON AS UPDATED BY RACHEL CAUFIELD, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, 
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Berkson.pdf. 
 19. Nelson, supra note 6, at 190. 
 20. BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 18, at 1. 
 21. Nelson, supra note 6, at 190. For a general discussion of these explanations, see id. 
 22. Id. at 192–93 (disagreeing with D.B. Eaton and James Willard Hurst that the 
movement toward elected judges was based on emotion and momentum toward reform (citing 
D.B. EATON, SHOULD JUDGES BE ELECTED? 4 (New York, Amerman, 1873); JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 140 (1950))). 
 23. Id. at 193 (citing FRANCIS R. AUMANN, CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 187–
89 (1940)). 
 24. Id. at 208. 
 25. Id. at 199 (citing Kermit L. Hall, Constitutional Machinery and Judicial Professionalism: 
The Careers of Midwestern State Appellate Court Judges, 1861–1899, in THE NEW HIGH 
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 29, 29 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984)). 
 26. Id. at 222. 
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economic interests,’ and they ‘criticized the repeated inability of the 
judiciary to strike down legislative measures.’”27 Ultimately, 
reformers wanted a democratic legislature that was “restrained by a 
strong independent judiciary.”28 Indeed, during the same conventions 
that created elected judiciaries, many states restricted legislative 
powers through other measures as well.29 
The convention delegates supporting an elected judiciary argued 
that only popular elections could “insulate the judiciary . . . from the 
branches that it was supposed to restrain.”30 For example, in the New 
York constitutional convention, during which participants eventually 
replaced judicial appointments by the legislature with judicial 
elections, delegate Charles Ruggles argued that the “appointed 
judiciary’s ‘connection with the legislative branch of government’ was 
a great fault because in ‘all cases in which the constitutionality of an 
act of the legislature was drawn in question . . . the point in dispute 
must necessarily have been prejudged in passing the law.’”31 
In the Indiana convention, Judge Borden maintained that “until 
the judiciary was placed ‘beyond the control of the other branches of 
government,’ . . . constitutional provisions ‘to protect the rights of the 
people, and to preserve a proper equilibrium between the different 
departments of the government,’ would be mere ‘parchment barriers’ 
against legislative or executive encroachments.”32 
Similarly, in Illinois, delegate David Davis claimed that he would 
“‘rather see judges the weather-cocks of public sentiment’ than see 
them ‘the instruments of power, . . . registering the mandates of the 
Legislature, and the edicts of the Governor.”33 Delegates William 
Archer and Archibald Williams further explained that because “‘one 
object of the judiciary was to protect the people from the other 
 
 27. Id. at 200 (quoting Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform 
and the Rise of the Elected Judiciary, 1846–1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 350 (1983)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 203. For example, Jackson sought to have U.S. senators and representatives 
elected directly and to eliminate the electoral college. Id. 
 30. Id. at 205. 
 31. Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEW YORK STATE 
CONVENTION, FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION 371 (Albany, Albany Argus 1846) 
[hereinafter NEW YORK DEBATES] (statement of Charles Ruggles)). 
 32. Id. at 205–06 (quoting REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, 1850, at 
1808–09 (Indianapolis, W.B. Burford Print Co. 1850) (statement of Borden, J.)). 
 33. Id. at 206 (quoting ILLINOIS CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 6, at 462 (statement of 
David Davis)). 
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branches of the government,’ it was necessary that the judiciary was 
‘above the control of the legislative or executive departments.’”34 
In addition to reasoning that judges who owed their jobs to 
politicians could never be truly independent, reformers also believed 
that appointment by politicians would produce intense cronyism. The 
appointment process “too often led to the selection of party hacks,”35 
with the judiciary often serving as pleasant pasture for failed but loyal 
politicians who had lost elections. This political loyalty would further 
reduce judicial independence and weaken the judiciary’s potential to 
check the power of the other branches of government. 
For example, in the Massachusetts convention, delegate 
Benjamin Butler cautioned about the consequences of cronyism: 
“Put [judges] where the people cannot get at them, . . . surround 
them with the $400,000,000 of incorporated wealth of the State, put 
around them a set of partizans, much greater, much more numerous, 
much more hungry, much more greedy and voracious than are even 
the partizans of the general government in this State,” 
 and one could predict the result.36 
Delegate Foster Hooper added that cronyism is “aggravated by 
the fact that ‘appointments are often confined to cliques and circles of 
a few politicians’ and ‘are frequently made as rewards for party 
services.’”37 
“In the Kentucky convention, delegate Squire Turner argued 
that . . . governors simply chose their favorites for the bench.”38 
Similarly, New York delegate “George Patterson disavowed the 
 
 34. Id. at 218 (quoting ILLINOIS CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 6, at 466 (statement of 
Archibald Williams); id. at 462 (statement of William Archer)). 
 35. Id. at 200 (quoting Kermit L. Hall, The ‘Route to Hell’ Retraced: The Impact of Popular 
Election on the Southern Appellate Judiciary, 1832–1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL 
HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 229, 229–30 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1983)). 
 36. Id. at 194–95 (quoting 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE STATE CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 788 (Boston, White & Potter 
1853) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853] (statement of Benjamin Butler)). 
 37. Id. at 195 (quoting MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 36, at 700 
(statement of Foster Hooper)). 
 38. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR 
THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY, 1849–1850, at 222 
(Frankfort, A.G. Hodges & Co. 1849) (statement of Squire Turner)). 
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‘political bench’ spawned by the appointive system.”39 In the Illinois 
convention, David Davis claimed that “if only the federal judiciary 
had been made elective, . . . the people ‘would have chosen judges, 
instead of broken down politicians.’”40 
Thus the desire to curtail the power of the legislatures and 
governors motivated the shift from appointed to elected judges. The 
reforms reflected the sentiment that the judiciary could function as a 
check and balance on the other governmental branches only if it truly 
were independent of them. Because the appointive system produced 
cronyism and judges that were beholden to politicians for their jobs, 
the reformers reasoned that the only means to a truly independent 
judiciary was election by the people. 
The reformers were initially delighted when “the incidence of 
judicial review soared in the second half of the nineteenth 
century . . . .”41 The turn of the century, however, brought a growing 
distrust of electorates, and during the Progressive Era, several states 
modified their judicial elections. For example, by 1927, twelve states 
had switched from partisan elections to nonpartisan elections.42 Other 
states moved to merit selection plans, under which the governor 
selects judges from a list of qualified applicants compiled by a 
bipartisan judicial nominating commission.43 Once appointed, the 
judge regularly faces unopposed nonpartisan retention elections.44 
This long historical evolution has spawned many variations of 
selection and retention methods. Although in many states the 
methods of selection and retention are the same, in other states they 
are different. The following are the combinations that states have 
chosen: 
1. Judges selected through gubernatorial appointment and merit 
plans are retained through gubernatorial reappointment, 
 
 39. Id. (“‘Whichever party had the governor . . . made their caucus nominations,’ 
[Patterson] warned, ‘and that was virtually an appointment.’” (omission in original) (quoting 
NEW YORK DEBATES, supra note 31, at 104) (statement of George Patterson)). 
 40. Id. (quoting ILLINOIS CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 6, at 462 (statement of David 
Davis)). 
 41. Kermit Hall, Judicial Independence and the Majoritarian Difficulty, in THE JUDICIAL 
BRANCH 60, 66 (Kermit Hall & Kevin McGuire eds., 2005). 
 42. BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 18, at 1. 
 43. Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 38 AKRON 
L. REV. 625, 628 (2005). 
 44. Michael R. Dimino, Judicial Elections Versus Merit Selection: The Futile Quest for a 
System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 804 (2004). 
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legislative elections, unopposed retention elections, or 
reappointment by a judicial nominating commission. 
2. Judges selected through legislative appointments are retained 
through legislative reappointments. 
3. Judges who are originally elected in partisan elections are 
retained through partisan elections or unopposed retention 
elections. 
4. Judges originally elected in nonpartisan elections are retained 
only through nonpartisan elections. 
Table 1 shows each state’s methods of selection and retention for 
the study period 1995–98.45 












Alabama P P Montana N N 
Alaska M R Nebraska M R 
Arizona M R Nevada N N 
Arkansas P P New Hampshire47 G - 
California G R New Jersey48 G G 
Colorado M R New Mexico P P 
Connecticut49 LA LA New York M G 
 
 45. Although other differences between the selection and retention methods of each state 
exist, the methods can be grouped into these primary categories. 
 46. DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 
1998, at 21–25 tbl.4 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 178932, 2000), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Methods of Judicial 
Selection, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2009). G=gubernatorial appointment or reappointment, P=partisan election 
or reelection, N=nonpartisan election or reelection, LA=legislative appointment or 
reappointment, LE=legislative election or reelection, M=merit plan, R=retention election, and 
J=reappointment by a judicial nominating commission. Table 1 slightly differs from ROTTMAN 
ET AL., supra, for New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Louisiana. An anonymous referee and 
editor for my earlier publication, Joanna Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on 
Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
997491, that used this table pointed out the correct classifications for these states that are 
reported here. 
 47. In New Hampshire, judges serve until age seventy. ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 
28 tbl.5. 
 48. In New Jersey, after an initial gubernatorial reappointment, judges serve until age 
seventy. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 6. 
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Delaware M G North Carolina P P 
Florida M R North Dakota N N 
Georgia N N Ohio50 N N 
Hawaii M J Oklahoma M R 
Idaho N N Oregon N N 
Illinois P R Pennsylvania P R 
Indiana M R Rhode Island51 M - 
Iowa M R South Carolina LE LE 
Kansas M R South Dakota M R 
Kentucky N N Tennessee M N 
Louisiana P P Texas P P 
Maine G G Utah M R 
Maryland M R Vermont M LE 
Massachusetts52 M - Virginia LA LA 
Michigan53 N N Washington N N 
Minnesota N N West Virginia P P 
Mississippi N N Wisconsin N N 
Missouri M R Wyoming M R 
II.  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER DIFFERENT SELECTION AND 
RETENTION METHODS 
A. Elected Judges 
Despite the original reformers’ confidence that an elected 
judiciary would be more independent than an appointed one, the 
reality of judicial elections soon led to a growing distrust of 
electorates. Ex-President William Howard Taft in 1913 declared that 
judicial elections were “disgraceful” and “so shocking . . . that we 
ought to condemn them.”54 Likewise, Professor Roscoe Pound argued 
that judges should be appointed rather than elected, stating, “Putting 
 
 49. In Connecticut, the governor nominates and the legislature appoints. ROTTMAN ET AL., 
supra note 46, at 21 tbl.4, 25 n.2. 
 50. In Ohio, political parties nominate candidates to run in nonpartisan elections. Am. 
Judicature Soc’y, supra note 46. 
 51. In Rhode Island, judges have life tenure. ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 28 tbl.5. 
 52. In Massachusetts, judges serve until age seventy. Id. at 28 n.8. 
 53. In Michigan, political parties nominate candidates to run in nonpartisan elections. Am. 
Judicature Soc’y, supra note 46. 
 54. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT: ITS ESSENCE, ITS PERMANENCE 
AND ITS PERILS 194–95 (1913). 
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courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politicians, in 
many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the 
bench.”55 
The distrust of judicial elections, however, was moderated by the 
fact that they used to be “low-key affairs, conducted with civility and 
dignity,”56 which were “as exciting as a game of checkers. . . . [p]layed 
by mail.”57 This all changed in Los Angeles in 1978, however, when a 
group of deputy district attorneys offered to support any candidate 
who would run against an unopposed incumbent trial judge, 
producing a record number of contests and defeated judges.58 Then, in 
the 1980s, battles over tort law in Texas produced “unprecedentedly 
costly, heated races” for its supreme court.59 
Since then, elections have become more contested and 
competitive. In 1988, only 33 percent of nonpartisan elections were 
contested.60 By 2000, this number had increased to 75 percent.61 
Likewise, 74 percent of partisan elections were contested in 1988.62 By 
2000, this number had grown to 95 percent. 63 
As elections have become more contested, incumbents have 
found it harder to win. In nonpartisan elections, only 4.3 percent of 
incumbents were defeated in 1980, 64 but 8 percent of incumbents were 
defeated in 2000.65 In partisan elections, 26.3 percent of incumbents 
were defeated in 1980,66 whereas the loss rate for incumbents in 2000 
 
 55. Guilty, Your Honour?, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 28, 29. 
 56. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV 1, 19 (1995). 
 57. Schotland, supra note 8, at 1079 (alteration in original) (quoting William C. Bayne, 
Lynchard’s Candidacy, Ads Putting Spice into Justice Race, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 29, 
2000, at DS1). 
 58. Id. at 1080. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, Predicting Challengers in State Supreme 
Court Elections: Context and the Politics of Institutional Design, 56 POL. RES. Q. 337, 343 tbl.2 
(2003). 
 61. Chris W. Bonneau, Patterns of Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State 
Supreme Court Elections, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 21, 27 tbl.6 (2004). 
 62. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 60, at 343 tbl.2. 
 63. Bonneau, supra note 61, at 27 tbl.6. 
 64. Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in 
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 165, 177 tbl.9.4 (Matthew Streb ed., 2007). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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was a stunning 45.5 percent.67 This rate of defeat is much higher than 
the rate at which incumbents lose in the U.S House or Senate or in 
state legislatures.68 
Following the substantial increase in the competitiveness of 
judicial elections, campaign spending on these elections has increased 
dramatically. Between 1990 and 2004, average campaign spending in 
nonpartisan elections increased by 100 percent, from approximately 
$300,000 to $600,000.69 Average spending in partisan elections during 
this period increased from approximately $425,000 to $1.5 million, an 
increase of over 250 percent.70 
The increasing cost of judicial campaigns has made it extremely 
difficult for candidates to win elections without substantial funding.71 
In 1997–1998, the top campaign fundraiser prevailed in approximately 
75 percent of contested state supreme court races, and in 2001–02, the 
top fundraiser won in 80 percent of the elections.72 
Many academics, elite lawyers, and judges fear that the 
increasing contentiousness of judicial elections threatens judicial 
independence.73 They argue that the increasing competitiveness of 
elections has likely heightened the pressure on judges to decide cases 
strategically.74 Moreover, with the costs of winning judicial elections 
increasing dramatically, judges are compelled to rule in ways that 
help them to obtain campaign funds. 
Indeed, several judges have admitted that reelection concerns 
may influence their judicial rulings. For example, former California 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths 
of Judicial Reform, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 319 (2001) (“Although justices are less likely to 
be challenged than House members, remarkably, on average, justices have a greater risk of 
being tossed out of office.”); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Does Quality Matter? 
Challengers in State Supreme Court Election, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. REV. 20, 21 (2006). 
 69. Chris W. Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court 
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES 
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 64, at 59, 63 fig.4.1. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 62 (noting that the incumbent’s percentage of the vote increases in direct 
proportion to the discrepancy in spending between the candidates but that elections tend to be 
more competitive when the candidates “spend roughly equivalent amounts of money”). 
 72. Id. at 32 & tbl. 11. 
 73. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 74. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme 
Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 430 (1992) (“[J]udges, like legislators, may adopt strategies to maximize 
their chances for reelection, especially given the demonstrated tendency of judges to act 
strategically . . . .”). 
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Supreme Court Justice Otto M. Kaus commented, “[T]o this day, I 
don’t know to what extent I was subliminally motivated by the thing 
you could not forget—that it might do you some good politically to 
vote one way or the other.”75 
Similarly, in a series of interviews with the members of 
Louisiana’s high court, a liberal justice acknowledged that his 
perception of his constituents was that they clearly preferred the 
death penalty as a punishment for murder and that they would 
retaliate against him at election time if the justice did not reflect 
constituent preferences in this set of judicial decisions . . . [and that] 
he does not dissent in death penalty cases against an opinion of the 
court to affirm a defendant’s conviction and sentence, expressly 
because of a perceived voter sanction, in spite of his deeply felt 
personal preferences to the contrary.76 
Even Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have expressed this 
perspective. After the Court reluctantly upheld on First Amendment 
grounds New York’s system for electing judges, Justices Kennedy and 
Breyer noted in their concurrence: 
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct 
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for 
competition among interest groups and political parties, the 
persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the 
perception and the reality of judicial independence and judicial 
excellence.77 
Indeed, substantial empirical evidence suggests that reelection 
concerns do strongly influence judges. Several studies have shown 
that the behavior of elected judges changes as reelection approaches. 
For example, evidence suggests that when electoral pressures 
intensify near the end of their terms, judges deviate from expected 
 
 75. Philip Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
1986, at 3 (quoting Otto M. Kaus, J., Cal. Supreme Court); see also id. (discussing the influence 
of elections on judges). 
 76. Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes 
and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1120 (1987). 
 77. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joined by 
Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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voting patterns,78 impose longer criminal sentences,79 and side with the 
majority in death penalty cases.80 
Other studies have found that the method of selection influences 
judges’ voting and that elected judges face greater voting pressures 
than appointed judges. For example, litigation rates are lower in 
states in which judges are elected, suggesting that elected judges’ 
political voting reduces uncertainty about court decisions so that 
more cases settle.81 Similarly, plaintiffs file more antidiscrimination 
claims in states that elect judges than in states that appoint judges, 
suggesting that elected judges have stronger proemployee 
preferences, inducing more employees to file claims.82 
Other studies find that the pressure is even greater for judges 
elected in partisan elections. For example, partisan-elected judges are 
more likely to redistribute wealth in torts cases from out-of-state 
businesses to in-state plaintiffs that are voters.83 Similarly, judges 
facing partisan elections are less likely to dissent on politically 
controversial issues84 and less likely to vote for challengers to a 
regulatory status quo.85 Likewise, in a previous study, I found that 
 
 78. Hall, supra note 76, at 1123 (“Whether voters and opponents are cognizant of the 
justices’ behavior or not, certain justices seem to fear the prospect of electoral sanction and 
consequently alter their behavior.”). 
 79. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind 
When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004). 
 80. See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from 
the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 24 (1995) (“[W]here judges must face voters to retain 
their positions, state partisan competition exerts a positive influence on support for the death 
penalty . . . .”); Hall, supra note 74, at 431 (discerning a “marked tendency” among liberal 
justices in Louisiana to disregard personal predilections against imposing the death penalty “to 
vote in accordance with constituent preferences”). 
 81. F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of 
Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 205, 232 (1999). 
 82. Timothy Besley & A. Abigail Payne, Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: 
Does Judicial Discretion Matter 18 (London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Research Paper No. 
PEPP04, 2005), available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/pepp/pepp04.pdf. 
 83. Eric Helland & Alex Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4 
AM. L. ECON. REV. 341, 368 (2002); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The 
Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 186 (1999). 
 84. See Hall, supra note 76, at 1123 (“To avoid singling themselves out for criticism during 
the re-election process . . . justices may suppress the expression of dissent.”); Hall, supra note 
74, at 442 (“District-based elections . . . influence liberal justices to join conservative majorities 
in death penalty cases in Texas, North Carolina, Louisiana, and Kentucky.”). 
 85. See F. Andrew Hanssen, Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An 
Empirical Analysis of the States, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 534, 536–37 (2000) (finding that, in states 
with appointed judiciaries, administrative agencies tend to employ larger staffs devoted to 
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judges who must be reelected by Republican voters in partisan 
elections tend to decide cases in accord with standard Republican 
policy: they are more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, for 
employers in labor disputes, for doctors and hospitals in medical 
malpractice cases, for businesses in products liability cases and torts 
cases generally, and against criminals in criminal appeals.86 
In contrast, one 2009 paper found that public opinion about 
abortion policy has a stronger effect on judicial decisions in 
nonpartisan systems than in partisan systems.87 Moreover, another 
2009 paper by Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner finds only mixed 
evidence of elected judges responding to political pressure more than 
appointed judges.88 
Other recent empirical studies have examined the influence of 
campaign contributions on judges’ case decisions. For example, in an 
earlier study, I found that contributions from interest groups are 
associated with increases in the probability that judges will vote for 
the litigants those interest groups favor.89 Similarly, other scholars 
have found a correlation between the sources of a judge’s funding and 
the judge’s rulings in arbitration decisions from the Alabama 
Supreme Court,90 in tort cases before state supreme courts in 
Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio, 91 in cases between two businesses in 
 
protecting regulatory policies from potential challenges because courts review and reverse those 
policies more frequently than courts in states with elected judges). 
 86. Shepherd, supra note 46 (manuscript at 6). 
 87. Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark, Judicial Independence and Nonpartisan 
Elections, 2009 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 53 & fig.2), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/brandice_canes_wrone/1/. 
 88. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu G. Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The 
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 26–27, 31, 36), available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/ 
cgi/reprint/ewn023. 
 89. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 670–72 
& tbls.7–8 (2009). 
 90. Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration 
Law in Alabama, 25 J.L. & POL. 645, 660 (1999) (examining arbitration decisions in the 
Alabama Supreme Court). 
 91. Eric N. Waltenburg & Charles S. Lopeman, 2000 Tort Decisions and Campaign 
Dollars, 28 SOUTHEASTERN POL. REV. 241, 248, 256 (2000) (examining tort cases before state 
supreme courts in Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio). 
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the Texas Supreme Court, 92 and in cases during the Supreme Court of 
Georgia’s 2003 term. 93 
Thus, empirical evidence establishes that retention concerns 
influence the voting of judges facing reelection. In turn, most scholars 
conclude that elected judges are less independent than appointed 
ones, when they define independent judges as those who “do[] not 
make decisions on the basis of the sorts of political factors (for 
example, the electoral strength of the people affected by a decision) 
that would influence, and in most cases control the decision were it to 
be made by a legislative body.”94 As I discuss in the next Section, 
however, in cases in which the state government has a stake, judges 
facing gubernatorial or legislative reappointment might feel more 
pressure to vote in favor of the government’s interest, making them 
less independent than judges facing reelection. 
B. Appointed Judges 
Although the evidence strongly suggests that retention concerns 
influence elected judges’ rulings in some cases, the influence is likely 
limited to the types of cases whose outcomes are important to voters 
or interest groups. Indeed, many previous empirical studies have 
focused on the types of cases that matter to voters, such as cases with 
politically controversial issues or cases between out-of-state 
businesses and in-state plaintiffs that are voters. It is not surprising 
that appointed judges would appear to be more independent in these 
types of cases; the governors or legislatures to whom the appointed 
judges are beholden often have little or no stake in the case 
outcomes. 
In other types of cases in which state governments do have a 
stake, however, judges seeking reappointment by the governor or 
legislature may be less independent than their elected counterparts. 
The power over judicial retention held by the governor or legislature 
offers the political branches of government direct opportunities to 
 
 92. See Madhavi McCall, The Politics of Judicial Elections: The Influence of Campaign 
Contributions on the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994–1997, 31 POL. & 
POL’Y 314, 330 (2003) (showing that when two litigants contribute to justices’ campaigns, Texas 
Supreme Court decisions tend to favor the litigant that contributed more money). 
 93. Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision 
Making 16 (Aug. 10, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
991364 (examining cases during the Supreme Court of Georgia’s 2003 term). 
 94. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 875 n.1 (1975). 
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sanction judges for unpopular rulings. Judges who consistently vote 
against the interests of the other branches of government may hurt 
their chances for reappointment. 
Thus, in many cases, judges seeking reappointment may feel 
pressure to vote in a way that favors the executive or legislative 
branches.95 For example, in cases in which the state government or a 
state agency is a party, judges seeking reappointment may feel 
pressure to vote in favor of the government litigant. Or, in statutory 
review cases, reappointed judges may be less likely to challenge 
existing legislation. 
Studies of Congress recognize that legislators are electorally 
pressured to consider the relative intensity of their constituents’ 
preferences on different issues.96 Constituents differ in their intensity 
for particular preferences, and this intensity affects the likelihood that 
the constituents will reward or punish the legislators at the polls. 
Thus, legislators are more likely to vote for a particular issue when 
that issue is quite important to constituents with a stake in the 
outcome of the vote and not particularly important to the constituents 
that have little or no stake.97 
Similarly, judges might consider the intensity of their 
constituents’ preferences about the outcomes of different cases. As 
elected judges’ primary constituents are the voters, judges facing 
reelection are more likely to vote consistently with the voters’ 
preferences in cases that the voters care strongly about. Similarly, as 
appointed judges’ constituents are governors or legislatures, judges 
facing reappointment should vote consistently with the preferences of 
the other governmental branches in cases in which the other branches 
have a stake. 
Few empirical studies have explored the independence of judges 
in cases in which the other branches of government have a large 
stake. Professors Brace, Langer, and Hall “examine all cases decided 
since Roe v. Wade by state supreme courts in which direct challenges 
 
 95. For a discussion of other nonpartisan concerns that might influence all judges, 
regardless of retention method, to vote in favor of government litigants, see, for example, Craig 
F. Emmert, An Integrated Case-Related Model of Judicial Decision Making: Explaining State 
Supreme Court Decisions in Judicial Review Cases, 54 J. POL. 543, 551 (1992). 
 96. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 3 (1990). 
 97. Id. at 129. 
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to state statutes regulating abortion were [raised].”98 Their empirical 
results provide only limited support for the hypothesis that judges 
facing reappointment are less likely to vote against the interests of the 
other government branches. Specifically, they find that judges subject 
to gubernatorial or legislative retention are less likely to hear 
abortion cases99 but judges facing reelection are less likely to overturn 
statutes regulating abortion.100 
Professor Hanssen indirectly tests whether appointed judges are 
less likely to rule against state administrative agencies.101 He studied 
agency staffing in state utility commissions, insurance commissions, 
and the public education bureaucracy.102 He surmises that higher 
staffing levels in states with appointed judges suggest that agencies 
feel more threatened by appointed judges, indicating that these 
judges are both more independent and more likely to rule against the 
agencies than elected judges.103 
In the next Part, my empirical model directly tests whether 
judges seeking gubernatorial or legislative reappointment vote 
strategically in cases in which the other branches of government have 
a stake. In this and all empirical analyses of judicial decisionmaking, 
however, it is important to remember that judges, like most political 
actors, are constrained in their ability to make decisions solely on the 
basis of personal preferences or incentives. The most important 
constraints will likely include the law relevant to each case and the 
state political environment. 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This Part examines empirically whether judges seeking 
gubernatorial or legislative reappointment decide cases more 
favorably to the other branches of government than other judges. If 
judges seeking reappointment routinely rule more favorably for 
government litigants, my results suggest that either retention 
concerns or political loyalty are strong influences on these judges. 
 
 98. Paul Brace, Melinda Gann Hall & Laura Langer, Judicial Choice and the Politics of 
Abortion: Institutions, Context, and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1265, 1278 (1999). 
 99. Id. at 1291. 
 100. Id. at 1294. 
 101. See Hanssen, supra note 85, at 536. 
 102. Id. at 535. 
 103. Id. at 537–38. 
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To test the influence of retention methods on judges’ voting in 
civil cases involving state government litigants, I use data from the 
State Supreme Court Data Project archive. These data include 
virtually all state supreme court cases in all fifty states from 1995 to 
1998.104 The data include more than 28,000 decisions involving more 
than 470 individual state supreme court judges. The data include 
variables that reflect case histories, case participants, legal issues, case 
outcomes, and individual justices’ behavior. I supplemented these 
data in several ways: with institutional variables that describe aspects 
of the judicial system of each state, with variables that describe the 
political affiliations of various groups and people in each state, and 
with detailed information about each judge’s career. 
I estimate a multivariate regression equation that measures how 
individual judges’ rulings are related both to the retention method 
and to other characteristics of the state, the judge, and the case.105 
A. The Model’s Technical Structure 
I first introduce the model in symbols, and I provide a brief 
outline of the variables. In the next Section, I explain the model more 
fully. The model is 
(1) Prob(GovtLitVotei=1|x)=Φ(β0+ β1RetentMethod+ β2Judge+ β3Case+ β4State) 
GovtLitVote The probability that the judge votes for the  
 government litigant in case i. 
RetentMethod Includes four indicator variables for whether a  
 vote is given by a judge 
who faces a gubernatorial reappointment, 
who faces a legislative reappointment, 
who faces a partisan reelection, 
who faces a nonpartisan reelection, or 
who has life tenure. 
 
 104. State dockets exceeding two hundred cases in a single year were selected from a 
random sample of two hundred cases. Typically, case quantities are unaffected due to the 
limited size of many state supreme court dockets. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, State 
Supreme Court Database Project: Coding Rules (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/ 
statecourt/CodingRules.html. 
 105. A related analysis with more detailed econometric explanations can be found in 
Shepherd, supra note 46 (manuscript at 14–16). 
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Judge Includes two judge-level variables: 
the party-adjusted surrogate judge ideology (PAJID) 
measure of judicial ideology, and the number of 
years the judge has been on the court. 
Case Includes several case-level variables: 
indicator variables for the other litigant in the case, 
and indicator variables for the general issue in the 
case. 
State Includes several state-level variables: 
the percentage of years since 1960 that each state’s 
legislature was majority Republican, 
an indicator variable for whether the state has a 
lower appellate court, and 
an indicator variable for whether the judges sit en 
banc. 
B. Details of the Model 
Equation (1) measures the relationship between judges’ voting 
and the retention method in cases in which the government is a 
litigant while controlling for many other factors that might also affect 
voting. 
1. Dependent Variable.  The dependent variable is the probability 
that the judge votes for the government litigant in each case. I 
examine four categories of civil government cases: cases in which any 
branch of the government is a litigant, cases in which a member of the 
executive branch is a litigant,106 cases in which a member of the 
legislative branch is a litigant,107 and cases in which a member of the 
judicial branch is a litigant.108 
In the civil cases, a judge is coded as voting for a litigant in the 
State Supreme Court Data Project archive if the judge voted to make 
 
 106. According to the State Supreme Court Database Project, this litigant could be the 
governor, the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the secretary of state, or any 
administrative agency. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Court Database Project: 
Codebook 16–17 (Aug. 2005), http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/Codebook.zip. 
 107. According to the State Supreme Court Database Project, this litigant could be either 
house of the state legislature or a legislative commission or committee. Id. 
 108. According to the State Supreme Court Database Project, this litigant could be a judge 
or court, prosecutor, or a jail, prison, or probation organization. Id. 
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the litigant any better off, regardless of whether the judge voted to 
reverse a lower court or to change the damage award. 
In addition, in a separate model I estimate the probability that 
the judge votes to overturn a state statute when one is challenged. 
2. Retention Method Variables.  RetentMethod includes the five 
primary variables of interest: a variable that indicates if a vote is given 
by a judge facing a gubernatorial reappointment, a legislative 
reappointment, a partisan reelection, a nonpartisan reelection, or if 
the judge has life tenure. As I have discussed,109 systems with 
gubernatorial and legislative reappointment offer the other branches 
of government direct opportunities to sanction judges for unpopular 
rulings. Thus, if these judges are acting strategically, they would be 
the least likely to vote against the interests of the other branches of 
government. 
Judges reelected in partisan and nonpartisan elections might also 
feel some pressure to vote in favor of the government interests. 
Reelection concerns might prevent these judges from voting against 
the preferences of the dominant political coalition within a state, 
which often controls one or both of the other branches of 
government. That is, the judges may be motivated to vote in favor of 
the interests of other political branches to ensure that they have other 
politicians’ support during their reelection. Because the other 
branches of government cannot directly sanction unpopular rulings as 
they can under appointive systems, however, judges facing reelection 
should feel less pressure to vote strategically. 
The baseline, or excluded category, includes votes from judges 
facing unopposed retention elections. These judges are subject to only 
a yes-or-no vote for retention, and they are rarely defeated.110 In fact, 
the most comprehensive study of judicial retention elections finds 
that only about 1 percent of judges lose retention elections. Thus, the 
voting of judges under these systems is likely to be more independent 
 
 109. See supra Part II.B. 
 110. Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964–1998, 83 JUDICATURE 79, 79, 
80 tbl.1 (1999) (studying ten states from 1964–98 and finding that only 52 of 4,588 judges (1.1 
percent) were defeated when they sought retention). 
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than judges in elective or appointive systems. Judges with permanent 
tenure should be the most autonomous in their voting.111 
3. Control Variables.  My estimation of Equation (1) separates 
the influence of each factor that is included, allowing me to 
distinguish the retention method’s influence on voting from other 
influences. Thus, to determine whether the retention method 
influences voting, it is important to control for as many other factors 
as possible to ensure that the results are not caused by something 
other than retention concerns.112 Ideally, we could quantify and 
include any factor that was related to voting. In practice, researchers 
include as many variables as is technically possible given data 
constraints. 
The control variables I include fall into three categories: judge-
level variables, case-level variables, and state-level variables. All of 
these variables should be related to voting. That is, these variables 
include possible influences on a judge’s vote in a particular case: the 
judge’s own characteristics, such as the judge’s years on the bench; 
case characteristics, such as the type of litigants; and state 
characteristics, such as the conservatism of the state’s laws. 
Unfortunately, one of the most important influences on a judge’s 
voting, the guilt or liability of the parties, is unquantifiable and, 
therefore, not included as a control variable. Nevertheless, the 
variables that I do include pick up the marginal influence of these 
other factors on judges’ voting. 
The variables in Judge control for judge-specific characteristics 
that may be related to judges’ voting. First, I include a measure of the 
ideological preferences of each judge. For this proxy, I use each 
judge’s party-adjusted surrogate judge ideology measure, or PAJID 
score. This score is the most common measure of judges’ ideology 
that political science studies use, and it is based on the assumption 
that judges’ ideologies can be best proxied by both their partisan 
affiliations and the ideologies of their states at the time of their initial 
 
 111. For a survey of the literature on motivations of judicial behavior, see Hugo M. Mialon, 
Paul H. Rubin & Joel L. Schrag, Judicial Hierarchies and the Rule-Individual Tradeoff, 15 
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 3, 5–7 (2007). 
 112. That is, if a third omitted variable has significant influence on voting and that omitted 
variable is strongly correlated with retention method, my analysis may erroneously attribute to 
the retention method variable the relationship between voting and the omitted third variable. 
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entry in office.113 Including the PAJID scores allows me to separate 
the influence of the judges’ own ideologies from the influence of 
retention methods. I also include a variable indicating the length of 
time in years that the individual judge has served on the court to 
control for voting changes throughout a judge’s career. 
The variables in Case control for case-level factors that may be 
related to judges’ voting. First, I include two dummy variables that 
indicate whether the nongovernment litigant in each case is a person 
or a business. I also include a series of indicator variables signifying 
the general issue in the case (election issues, First Amendment issues, 
government regulation issues, practice-of-law issues, public-contract 
issues, privacy issues, or torts issues involving state governments). 
The variables in State control for state-level characteristics that 
may be related to case outcomes. First, I include the percentage of 
years since 1960 that each state’s legislature was majority Republican. 
I use this variable as a proxy for the conservatism of the states’ laws. 
This control allows me to isolate the influence of the retention 
method from judges simply applying conservative laws in cases with a 
government litigant. 
I also include variables that indicate whether the states’ supreme 
courts have discretion to grant review (that is, whether they have a 
lower appellate court) and whether the judges sit en banc. Both of 
these variables may be relevant to the types of cases that the supreme 
courts hear and, in turn, to the judges’ voting. When supreme courts 
have discretion to grant review, the litigants do not alone control 
which appeals the courts hear. Thirty-nine states have lower appellate 
courts, making review by their supreme courts discretionary. In these 
courts, the judges may choose to hear cases that give them 
opportunities to exercise their ideological preferences.114 
Whether the supreme courts sit en banc may also influence the 
types of cases that the courts hear. The supreme courts of Alabama, 
 
 113. See Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences of State 
Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387, 400–04 (2000). 
 114. Conceivably, litigants could decide to settle after the court has granted review of their 
case; the granting of review may signal that the court plans to vote ideologically. In a study of 
civil appeals in forty-six large counties between 2001–2005, however, no litigants withdrew cases 
after a court of last resort granted review. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
APPEALS FROM GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES, 2001–2000, at 9 (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Special Report No. NCJ 212979, 2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/agctlc05.pdf. 
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Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Virginia, and Washington often do not sit en 
banc; instead, various subsets of the judges hear each case. The 
supreme courts of other states may periodically not sit en banc if, for 
example, a particular judge has a conflict. If the ideologies of the 
judges on a specific court differ and the litigants do not know which 
judges will hear their case because the court does not sit en banc, then 
the litigants cannot, when making settlement decisions, fully 
anticipate the panel’s ideological leaning. In some cases, litigants may 
not settle cases that they would have settled had they known in 
advance their judges’ identities. 
As is standard and appropriate in such an analysis,115 the 
equation also includes a set of year-indicator variables116 that capture 
national trends and influences that affect all judges but vary over 
time. The variables correct for the possibility that a change in voting 
may be due, not to retention method, but to factors that affect all 
judges, such as trends in conservatism or changes in national laws.117 
4. Estimation Method.  Equation (1) is estimated with a 
maximum likelihood probit model. I present the marginal effects of 
each retention method variable on the probability of a judge voting 
for the government litigant. The results tables report the increase in 
the probability of a judge voting for a government litigant under the 
particular retention method as compared to the base category (judges 
facing retention elections), holding the case’s other characteristics 
constant. 
In addition, the t-statistics are computed from standard errors 
clustered by case to correct for possible clustering effects. Clustering 
effects are a concern because observations may be independent 
across groups (clusters) but not necessarily within groups.118 Thus, the 
standard errors from observations from within the same case may be 
relatively small compared to standard errors from observations from 
other cases. Not controlling for possible clustering effects could 
 
 115. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116–18 (5th ed. 2003). 
 116. A dummy variable is a yes-or-no indicator with only two possible values, 0 and 1. Id. at 
116. 
 117. I am unable to include state-level and judge-level fixed effects because the majority of 
these variables are perfectly collinear with the retention variables, many of which do not change 
during the four-year sample period. 
 118. For the mathematical explanation of clustering effects, see HALBERT WHITE, 
ASYMPTOTIC THEORY FOR ECONOMETRICIANS 135–36 (1984). 
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artificially inflate my t-statistics, producing results that incorrectly 
appear to be statistically significant. 
C. Primary Empirical Results 
The results support the hypothesis that judges seeking 
reappointment often vote strategically in cases in which the other 
branches of government have a stake. Table 2 reports the coefficients 
and t-statistics for the retention method variables in five separate 
estimations. The estimations use five different dependent variables: 
the probability that a judge votes for any government litigant, the 
probability that a judge votes for an executive branch litigant, the 
probability that a judge votes for a legislative branch litigant, the 
probability that a judge votes for a judicial branch litigant, and the 
probability that a judge declares a state statute unconstitutional. The 
full results for all variables in the estimation on the probability that a 
judge votes for any government litigant are reported in the table in  
Appendix A. 
Table 2 indicates the relationship between judges’ voting and the 
retention method variables. In the table, the top number in each cell 
is the regression coefficient, which indicates the magnitude and 
direction of the relationship between judges’ voting and the 
retention-method variables. A negative coefficient indicates that a 
retention method variable reduces the probability that a judge votes 
for the government litigant. In contrast, a positive coefficient 
indicates that a retention method variable increases the probability 
that a judge votes for the government litigant. 
In addition, the table reports the t-statistic for each coefficient. In 
each cell, it is the bottom number, in parentheses. Coefficients with t-
statistics equal to or greater than 1.645 are considered statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, meaning that there is 90 percent 
certainty that the coefficient is different from zero. T-statistics equal 
to or greater than 1.96 indicate statistical significance at the more-
certain 5 percent level, and t-statistics equal to or greater than 2.576 
indicate statistical significance at the most-certain 1 percent level. 
Empiricists typically require t-statistics of at least 1.645 to conclude 
that one variable affects another in the direction indicated by the 
coefficient. In the table, “*” and “+” indicate significance at the 5 
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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The results indicate that judges facing gubernatorial 
reappointment are more likely to vote for an executive branch litigant 
and for any government litigant.119 The magnitudes of the marginal 
effects are statistically significant, but not huge. For example, the 
results suggest that a judge facing a gubernatorial reappointment, 
compared to the base category of judges facing unopposed retention 
elections, is approximately 7 percentage points more likely to vote in 
favor of the executive branch litigant. 
Judges facing legislative reappointment are more likely to vote 
for litigants from the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the 
judicial branch, and for general government litigants. Although the 
executive and judicial branches are not directly responsible for these 
judges’ retention, many cases may involve challenges to the 
application of the law by either the governor or a judge. In these 
cases, a vote for the executive or judicial branch that is implementing 
the law is equivalent to a vote for the legislature. 














Gubernatorial  0.06+ 0.07* -.44 -0.09 
Reappointment (1.89) (1.97) (1.50) (0.58) 
Legislative  0.09* 0.08* 0.40* 0.25* 
Reappointment (3.54) (2.35) (2.38) (3.67) 
Partisan  0.03 0.06* -0.18 -0.03 
Reelection (1.36) (2.10) (0.93) (0.43) 
Nonpartisan  0.01 0.03 0.10 0.08 
Reelection (0.58) (1.30) (0.42) (1.60) 
Permanent  -0.04 -0.06 -0.52 -0.02 
Tenure  (1.38) (1.53) (1.48) (0.21) 
Number of Obs. 24865 15985 349 3704 
Log Likelihood -14899 -10011 -191.6 -2054.9 
 
 119. The statistically significant results for voting for all government litigants, however, are 
probably largely driven by the statistically significant results for voting for executive branch 
litigants. 
 120. Table 2 reports the marginal effects of each retention method variable on the 
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The other 
control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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The results are slightly weaker for judges facing partisan 
reelections. These judges are more likely to favor only executive 
branch litigants. This result suggests that partisan elected judges may 
sometimes vote to win the support of the governor in their next 
reelection. Indeed, some scholars have argued that support by 
political party leaders is essential to a judge’s victory in many partisan 
elections.121 
In contrast, judges facing nonpartisan reelections are not more 
likely to vote for any government litigant, compared to judges facing 
unopposed retention elections. 
Finally, the coefficients for the probabilities that a judge with 
permanent tenure votes for any government litigant are all negative, 
suggesting that these judges are less likely to favor government 
litigants than judges facing unopposed retention election. The 
coefficients, however, are all statistically insignificant, preventing 
meaningful comparisons. 
Thus, the results show that judges facing gubernatorial 
reappointment, legislative reappointment, or partisan reelection are 
more likely to vote for certain government litigants than judges with 
life tenure or judges facing nonpartisan reelections or retention 
elections in merit systems. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that these judges vote strategically in the cases that involve 
issues important to the government branches that are responsible for 
or important to their retention. 
D. Political Loyalty or Retention Concerns 
Appointed judges’ voting in favor of government litigants may 
reflect retention concerns or political loyalty, or both. That is, judges 
may feel ex ante pressure to vote strategically to avoid reappointment 
denials from the other branches of government. Alternatively, judges 
may feel ex post pressure to vote in favor of the other government 
branches to show loyalty to the politicians who appointed them. 
Although both ex ante and ex post concerns may influence 
judges’ voting, I perform several analyses to try to distinguish the 
relative importance of each effect. First, I reestimate Equation (1) 
with an additional variable that indicates which states use 
 
 121. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Judicial Politics: Making the Case for Merit Selection, 68 
ALB. L. REV. 713, 717–18 (2005) (looking to New York City as a typical example of how lack of 
voter interest “vests judicial selection with political party leaders”). 
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gubernatorial appointments for judges’ initial terms but then use a 
different method for retention. California and New Hampshire select 
and retain judges in this way; no states switch from legislative 
appointment to another retention method. This estimation can 
measure how voting for government litigants differs between judges 
facing gubernatorial reappointment and judges that were originally 
appointed by the governor but face a different retention method. 
Table 3 reports the results. The results indicate that, whereas judges 
facing gubernatorial reappointment are more likely to vote for 
executive branch litigants and total government litigants (compared 
to the base category), originally appointed judges that face another 
retention method are less likely to vote for these litigants (compared 
to the base category). Although the results for appointed judges that 
face another retention method are based on judicial voting in only 
two states, they are consistent with retention concerns exerting a 
stronger influence than political loyalty on judges facing 
reappointment. 








Gubernatorial  0.06+ 0.07+ 
Reappointment (1.89) (1.94) 




Legislative  0.09* 0.08* 
Reappointment (3.50) (2.28) 
Partisan  0.03 0.06+ 
Reelection (1.24) (1.92) 
Nonpartisan  0.01 0.02 
Reelection (0.46) (1.11) 
Permanent  -0.03 -0.05 
Tenure  (1.04) (1.21) 
Number of Obs. 24865 15985 
Log Likelihood -14892 -10002 
 
 122. Table 3 reports the marginal effects of each retention method variable on the 
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The other 
control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Next, I explore whether judges are more likely to vote for 
government litigants as their retention approaches. I reestimate 
Equation (1) with interaction variables between the retention 
methods and the years to retention.123 Table 4 reports the results. The 
coefficients indicate the marginal increase in the probability that a 
judge from each retention method votes for the government litigant 
as the judge gets one year closer to retention. 
The results suggest that judges facing gubernatorial 
reappointment, legislative reappointment, and partisan reelections 
are all more likely to vote for certain government litigants as 
retention approaches. For example, the probability that a judge facing 
a gubernatorial reappointment votes for an executive branch litigant 
increases by 1.6 percent for each year the judge gets closer to 
retention. 
The results imply that judges appear to engage in more strategic 
voting as retention approaches. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that retention concerns are an important influence on 
judges’ voting in cases involving government interests; if political 
loyalty were the only influence on judges’ voting, judges’ likelihood of 
voting for government litigants would not increase as retention drew 
near. If anything, political loyalty should induce judges to more 
strongly favor government interests earlier in their term, soon after 
they receive their appointment. 




















Gub. Reappt. 0.016* 0.017*  -0.01 -0.03* 
* Years to 
Retention 
(3.82) (3.52)  (0.55) (1.97) 
 
 123. The variables are actually the interaction between each retention method and the 
inverse of the years to retention (as the longest number of years to retention during my sample 
is twelve, the inverse years to retention is thirteen minus the years to retention). Moreover, the 
sample is limited to judges that don’t have life tenure to compare the impact of approaching 
retention on judges under different retention methods. 
 124. Table 4 reports the marginal effects of each retention method variable on the 
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The other 
control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Leg. Reappt.  0.01* 0.008* 0.05* 0.03* 0.01 
* Years to 
Retention 
(3.28) (2.20) (2.21) (3.04) (1.31) 
 
Partisan 
Reelection 0.005* 0.007* -0.006 -0.006 0.003 
* Years to 
Retention 
(2.21) (2.36) (0.34) (0.89) (0.46) 
 
Nonpartisan 
Reelect -0.0005 0.002 -0.002 -0.0009 0.007 
* Years to 
Retention 
(0.31) (1.10) (0.10) (0.20) (1.07) 
 
Number of 
Obs. 13180 8378 184 2094 912 
Log 
Likelihood 
-7723 -5069 -97 -1137 -487 
Finally, I test whether judges vote differently in their last term 
before retirement than they do when facing retention. Thirty-seven 
states have mandatory retirement laws that compel judges to retire 
sometime between age seventy and seventy-five. By examining how 
judges vote in their last term before mandatory retirement, I can test 
whether appointed judges that no longer have retention concerns are 
still more likely to vote in favor of government litigants. 
Table 5 reports the results. It appears that many judges in their 
last term before mandatory retirement are less likely to vote for 
government litigants than if they were not retiring. The results 
suggest that no significant difference in voting exists between the base 
category and either retiring judges that would have faced 
gubernatorial reappointment (if they had not retired) and retiring 
judges that would have faced a partisan reelection (if they had not 
retired). Retiring judges that would have faced legislative 
reappointment (if they had not retired), however, are still 
significantly more likely to vote for government litigants than the 
base category. 
The insignificant results for retiring judges in gubernatorial 
reappointment systems and partisan reelection systems suggest that, 
for these judges, retention concerns are the dominant influence on 
their voting in cases in which the state government has a stake. When 
these judges no longer have retention concerns, they are no more 
likely to vote for government litigants than other judges. 
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The statistically significant results for retiring judges in legislative 
reappointment systems, however, suggest that retention concerns are 
not the only influence on these judges. Political loyalty also appears 
to be a strong influence that continues to affect judges’ voting even in 
their last term before mandatory retirement. 










Gubernatorial  0.04 0.05 0.105 
Reappointment (0.69) (0.77) (0.85) 
 
Legislative  0.11* 0.124* -0.02 
Reappointment (3.14) (2.68) (0.10) 
 
Partisan  0.000001 0.005 0.11 
Reelection (0.0001) (0.07) (1.00) 
 
Nonpartisan  0.03 0.03 0.17 
Reelection (0.91) (0.67) (1.48) 
Number of Obs. 2469 1578 299 
Log Likelihood -1409 -956 -110 
The results thus suggest that, although retention concerns and 
political loyalty are both possible influences on judges’ voting in cases 
in which the state government has a stake, for many judges, retention 
concerns seem to be the most important consideration. 
E. Judicial Review under Different Retention Methods 
I also explore whether the willingness of judges to declare state 
statutes unconstitutional differs among retention methods. If judges 
facing gubernatorial or legislative reappointment are less likely to 
challenge the legislation of the other governmental branches, this 
 
 125. Table 5 reports the marginal effects of each retention method variable on the 
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The estimation 
is limited to the sample of judges in their last term of office before mandatory retirement in 
states that do not have permanent tenure for judges. There were not enough observations for an 
estimation on the probability of judges voting for legislative branch litigants. The other control 
variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols “*” 
and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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would suggest that these judges vote strategically so that the other 
branches of government will not sanction them for unpopular rulings. 
I estimate a new model in which the dependent variable is the 
probability that the judge votes to overturn a state statute when one is 
challenged. I test both whether the probability of overturning statutes 
differs among retention methods and whether the probability of 
overturning statutes changes as retention approaches. 
Table 6 reports the results. The results suggest that no 
statistically significant difference exists among retention methods in 
judges’ likelihood of overturning statutes. The results do suggest, 
however, that judges facing gubernatorial reappointment become less 
likely to overturn statutes as retention approaches; the statistically 
significant coefficient indicates that each year closer to retention 
makes a judge facing a gubernatorial reappointment 3 percent less 
likely to overturn a statute. 
Although the results suggest there is no significant difference 
among judges’ likelihood of overturning statutes under different 
retention methods, other explanations also exist for the weak results. 
Other factors may also have a stronger influence on judges voting to 
overturn statutes.126 Or governors and legislatures may not oppose 
overturning statutes if the statutes were enacted under different 
administrations or legislative majorities, and thus one would not 
expect differences among retention methods. Alternatively, there 
may be no difference in overturning statutes if there is a selection bias 
in the cases that the courts hear. Prior evidence suggests that, because 
courts that do not want to overturn the legislation of the other 
government branches refuse to hear the statutory challenges in the 
first place, judges in those courts do not have a lower rate of 
overturning statutes.127 
 
 126. For a discussion of other factors, see Brace et al., supra note 98, at 1291; supra notes 
98–100 and accompanying text. 
 127. For evidence of this effect, see Brace et al., supra note 98, at 1291. 
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Declare State Law 
Unconstitutional  Retention Method 
Declare State Law 
Unconstitutional  
Gubernatorial  -0.03 Gub. Reappt. -0.03* 
Reappointment (0.28) * Years to Retention (1.97) 
 
Legislative  0.05 
 
Leg. Reappt.  0.01 
Reappointment (0.39) * Years to Retention (1.31) 
 
Partisan  0.05 
 
Partisan Reelection 0.003 
Reelection (0.59) * Years to Retention (0.46) 
 
Nonpartisan  0.13+ 
 
Nonpartisan Reelect 0.007 
Reelection (1.84) * Years to Retention (1.07) 
 
Permanent  0.09  
 
Tenure  (0.74)   
Number of Obs. 1873 Number of Obs. 912 
Log Likelihood -1064 Log Likelihood -487 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this analysis support the hypothesis that judges 
facing gubernatorial or legislative reappointment vote strategically to 
avoid reappointment denials. There are, however, potential 
weaknesses with this analysis. For instance, the data cannot 
differentiate between cases in which the other government branches 
have a large stake in the outcome of the case versus a small stake; 
only a much more detailed case analysis could provide this 
information. This analysis is also unable to control for selection bias. 
That is, there could be significant differences in the types of cases that 
are appealed to the state supreme courts among different retention 
methods. Moreover, there are other competing alternative 
explanations for the patterns observed in the data. For example, the 
fact that judges facing gubernatorial reappointment are more likely to 
 
 128. Table 6 reports the marginal effects of each retention method variable on the 
probability of a judge voting to overturn state statutes, based on probit estimates. The other 
control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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vote for executive branch litigants could be explained by better 
decisions and rulemaking by governors in states that entrust judicial 
retention to the executive branch. Alternatively, states with strong 
executive branches may also have a body of doctrine that is very 
deferential to the executive branch; the judges may simply be 
neutrally applying the proexecutive law. 
When the results are considered collectively rather than 
individually, however, the evidence supports the hypothesis that 
retention concerns influence appointed judges. That judges’ strategic 
voting increases as retention approaches but is almost nonexistent 
among judges with life tenure or those facing mandatory retirement 
strongly suggests that retention concerns are an important influence. 
The results also suggest that, in many types of cases, judges 
seeking gubernatorial or legislative reappointment are at least as 
strategic, and possibly more strategic, than judges facing reelection. 
Although numerous scholars have argued that elective systems 
threaten judicial independence, my results suggest that appointive 
systems also lead to bias in certain types of cases. Moreover, whereas 
elected judges that vote strategically are defended as being 
accountable to the people they represent, there is no defendable 
explanation for appointed judges favoring government litigants. This 
form of strategic voting by appointed judges threatens the separation 
of powers that underlies American democracy. Judges who are 
beholden to politicians for their jobs may be unable to check the 
power of the other governmental branches. 
The distinct risks both elective and appointive systems pose 
should be considered as states evaluate their existing systems or 
consider reforms. Numerous previous studies have shown that voters’ 
preferences influence how judges facing reelection vote. Similarly, the 
preferences of government branches responsible for retaining judges 
appear to influence how judges facing reappointment vote. The lesson 
from these studies may be that judicial independence is only possible 
when judges face no retention concerns. Thus, either permanent 
tenure systems or merit selection systems that have extremely high 
retention rates may be the best systems if a state’s primary goal is 
increasing judicial independence. 
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APPENDIX A: 













Gubernatorial  0.06+ 0.07* -.44 -0.09 
Reappointment (1.89) (1.97) (1.50) (0.58) 
 
Legislative  0.09* 0.08* 0.40* 0.25* 
Reappointment (3.54) (2.35) (2.38) (3.67) 
 
Partisan  0.03 0.06* -0.18 -0.03 
Reelection (1.36) (2.10) (0.93) (0.43) 
 
Nonpartisan  0.01 0.03 0.10 0.08 
Reelection (0.58) (1.30) (0.42) (1.60) 
 
Permanent  -0.04 -0.06 -0.52 -0.02 
Tenure  (1.38) (1.53) (1.48) (0.21) 
 
Other Litigant  0.025 0.052* 0.20 0.15* 
Is a Person (1.22) (2.14) (1.27) (3.10) 
 
Other Litigant  -0.038+ -0.013 0.24 -0.21* 
Is a Business (1.69) (0.51) (1.18) (2.35) 
 
Judges’ PAJID 0.001* 0.001 0.007* 0.002* 
Scores (2.90) (1.35) (2.74) (2.25) 
 
Percent Years with  0.002* 0.0004* 0.004 0.0009 
Repub. Legis.  (6.15) (3.74) (1.23) (1.20) 
 
Years on  -0.0002 0.0004 0.006 0.0015 
Court (0.38) (0.70) (1.18) (1.17) 
 
Lower Appellate 0.012 -0.014 -0.28 0.098+ 
Court Indicator (0.66) (0.63) (1.15) (1.82) 
 
En Banc 0.003 0.007 0.10 -0.034 
Indicator (0.19) (0.36) (0.54) (0.74) 
 
 
 129.  Appendix A reports the marginal effect of each retention method variable on the 
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The indicator 
variables for year and the general issue in the case are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
